Poll: Spaniards Fear Ceuta Crisis Could Trigger Armed Conflict With Morocco

Key Points

• A September poll conducted by independent polling firm PF Global for POLITICO found that 58% of Spanish respondents believed tensions over Ceuta and Melilla could trigger an armed conflict between Spain and Morocco within the next decade.
• Three-quarters of respondents considered Morocco a genuine threat to Spain’s territorial integrity, while more than 80% rated the risk posed by Morocco as moderate to significant.
• Supporters of the far-right Vox party and the conservative People’s Party were particularly concerned about the possibility of armed conflict.
• Nearly two-thirds of supporters of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s Socialist Party also regarded Morocco as a genuine threat, although Socialist voters were divided over whether a military confrontation was likely.
• The survey followed a major migration crisis in Ceuta involving the reported arrival of more than 70,000 migrants in late July, intensifying political criticism of Sánchez’s government.
• Sánchez rejected allegations that Morocco orchestrated the influx, while opposition politicians and a police report raised questions about Rabat’s possible involvement.
• Despite concerns about future conflict, approximately two-thirds of respondents expected Ceuta and Melilla to remain under Spanish control over the following 20 years.
• The Spanish royal visit to Ceuta and Melilla was expected to attract close attention in both Spain and Morocco, amid continuing diplomatic sensitivities.
• Morocco’s King Mohammed VI acknowledged that bilateral cooperation faced “major challenges” but did not directly address the Spanish king’s visit in his first public appearance following the crisis.
• A protest was expected in Fnideq, on the Moroccan side of the border, on 14 October, highlighting the continuing sensitivity surrounding the Spanish exclaves.

Madrid Journals (MJ) October 13, 2026 – A September opinion poll commissioned by POLITICO and conducted by independent polling firm PF Global has found that 58 per cent of respondents in Spain believe tensions surrounding Ceuta and Melilla could lead to an armed conflict with Morocco within the next decade. The findings follow a major migration crisis in Ceuta that intensified political debate over border security, Spanish sovereignty and Madrid’s relations with Rabat. Three-quarters of those surveyed considered Morocco a genuine threat to Spain’s territorial integrity, while more than 80 per cent assessed the country as posing a moderate to significant risk. The results come as King Felipe VI and Queen Letizia visit Spain’s North African enclaves, a trip attracting diplomatic attention because Morocco disputes Spanish sovereignty over both territories.

What did the poll reveal about the risk of armed conflict between Spain and Morocco?

The survey, conducted by PF Global in September and published by POLITICO on 13 October, indicates widespread public concern about the future of relations between Spain and Morocco. According to the poll findings reported by POLITICO, 58 per cent of respondents believed that tensions over Ceuta and Melilla were likely to trigger an armed conflict within ten years.

The result reflects public perceptions following the migration crisis in July, when more than 70,000 people crossed into Ceuta from Morocco over a short period. The episode placed considerable pressure on local services and prompted questions about the security of Spain’s external border and the European Union’s capacity to respond to sudden migration movements.

The poll measures what respondents believe could happen; it does not establish that a military confrontation is imminent or that either government intends to initiate one.

The distinction is important because the figures concern perceived risk rather than a military assessment of Spain’s or Morocco’s intentions and capabilities. The survey results nevertheless show that concerns about the two enclaves have become a significant element of the Spanish public debate.

The findings also place the migration crisis within a wider dispute over sovereignty. Ceuta and Melilla are Spanish autonomous cities on the North African coast, surrounded by Moroccan territory. Spain administers both, while Morocco regards them as territories that should come under Moroccan sovereignty.

Why do many Spaniards regard Morocco as a threat to territorial integrity?

According to the POLITICO survey, three-quarters of respondents considered Morocco a genuine threat to Spain’s territorial integrity. More than 80 per cent placed Morocco in the moderate-to-significant risk category, putting it ahead of China, the United States and Russia in the survey’s comparison of perceived foreign threats.

The figures suggest that the immediate geographical dispute and the recent border emergency weighed heavily on respondents’ assessments. Unlike distant international security concerns, the relationship with Morocco directly affects Spain’s management of its North African territories, migration routes and cross-border cooperation.

The July influx heightened those concerns because of the scale and speed of the arrivals. Spain’s government faced pressure to restore control at the border, manage the humanitarian consequences and coordinate the return of people who had entered irregularly.

In a statement to parliament on 3 September, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez said approximately 70,000 people had entered Ceuta irregularly during the crisis. He described the government’s response as involving additional police and Civil Guard personnel, military support, temporary barriers and increased coordination with Moroccan authorities. Sánchez also said more than 63,000 people had returned within 72 hours of the crossings.

These figures help explain why the incident became a national security issue as well as a migration-management challenge. However, they do not independently establish that Morocco deliberately organised the crossings.

The poll also indicates that public concern extends beyond the immediate handling of migration. Its central finding links the disputed status of Ceuta and Melilla to the possibility of a future armed confrontation, although the survey cannot determine whether that outcome will occur.

How did Spain’s political parties respond to the Ceuta crisis?

The migration emergency triggered criticism of Sánchez’s Socialist-led government and renewed debate about the way Madrid manages relations with Morocco.

Alberto Núñez Feijóo, leader of the conservative People’s Party, accused Morocco of spearheading and coordinating the crisis and argued that the Spanish government had concealed its role. The allegations formed part of the opposition’s criticism of Sánchez’s response to the border emergency.

The supplied POLITICO report also noted that Sumar, a junior partner in Sánchez’s government, questioned Morocco’s possible involvement. A police report reportedly alleged that Moroccan agents had helped orchestrate the mass movement. These allegations remain distinct from a conclusive finding that the Moroccan government directed the crossings.

Sánchez rejected claims that Rabat was responsible. While describing the influx as an attack on Spain’s territorial integrity, he blamed smugglers and criminal networks for exploiting the circumstances that enabled the crossings. His government’s account therefore differed from the interpretation advanced by opposition politicians.

The disagreement has important political implications because border security and national sovereignty are issues on which the government is under pressure to demonstrate effective control.

The original POLITICO report also connected the crisis to Spain’s position in the EU migration debate. Madrid faced criticism over its opposition to tougher European migration policies, while EU institutions and national ministers discussed emergency measures for responding to mass movements that might be engineered or exploited by criminal networks.

The dispute consequently extends beyond the bilateral relationship. It also concerns how European governments distinguish between irregular migration, organised smuggling and possible attempts to apply political pressure through border movements.

Which Spanish voters are most concerned about a possible conflict?

The survey found substantial differences between political groups, although concerns about Morocco were not confined to one party’s supporters.

More than three-quarters of respondents who said they would vote for the far-right Vox party considered an armed conflict with Morocco likely within the next decade. Among supporters of the People’s Party, the corresponding figure was 68 per cent.

These results show that voters aligned with the conservative opposition were particularly concerned about the possibility of a military confrontation. They are also consistent with the prominence that border control and territorial sovereignty have assumed in political criticism of the government.

However, the survey did not show that concern was limited to opposition voters. Nearly two-thirds of supporters of Sánchez’s Socialist Party also considered Morocco a genuine threat to Spain’s territorial integrity.

Socialist voters were more divided when asked whether an armed conflict was likely. According to the supplied report, 47 per cent considered it likely, while 43 per cent rejected that assessment. The figures suggest that Socialist supporters could share concerns about national sovereignty without necessarily agreeing that the dispute would lead to war.

The results should not be interpreted as a direct prediction of voting behaviour. Concern about a foreign policy issue does not necessarily determine how someone votes, and the supplied material does not establish that the poll’s findings will translate into a particular electoral outcome.

Nevertheless, the results show that the dispute over Ceuta and Melilla has the potential to remain politically significant across party lines.

Why do Vox and People’s Party supporters view the dispute differently?

The higher level of concern among Vox and People’s Party supporters is relevant to the political debate over how Spain should respond to the crisis. The opposition has placed greater emphasis on the government’s handling of the border and the need to protect Spanish sovereignty.

Feijóo’s accusation that Morocco coordinated the influx directly challenges Sánchez’s account of events. The government, by contrast, has rejected claims that Rabat orchestrated the crossings and has pointed to smugglers and criminal networks.

The available poll results do not explain every reason behind the differences between party supporters. They do, however, demonstrate that perceptions of Morocco as a security threat are widespread and that the likelihood of armed conflict is assessed differently across political groups.

This division matters because Spain’s response must address public concerns while maintaining diplomatic channels with a neighbouring country whose cooperation is important for border management.

What role does the European Union play in the dispute?

The crisis has also raised questions about the EU’s approach to sudden, large-scale movements of people across its external borders.

Ceuta is part of Spain and the European Union, although it is outside the EU customs territory and the Schengen area. The scale of the July crossings therefore raised concerns about border management, emergency reception capacity and the coordination of responses between Spain and European institutions.

The supplied POLITICO report says the European Commission and national ministers have discussed emergency measures for situations in which mass movements could be engineered or weaponised. However, the proposed response framework has also been linked to the activities of smugglers and criminal networks.

That distinction is significant. Irregular migration, organised criminal activity and state-directed pressure are different matters, and evidence supporting one explanation does not automatically establish another.

Spain’s position also involves balancing domestic expectations with the practical need for cooperation across the border. Effective migration management requires operational coordination, while allegations of deliberate interference can complicate diplomatic relations.

The poll does not establish how EU policy will change as a result of the crisis. It does show that the events have heightened public concern about the relationship between border management and territorial security.

Why does the history of Ceuta and Melilla remain important?

The dispute has historical roots that extend well beyond the latest migration emergency.

Ceuta and Melilla have long been administered by Spain, but Morocco maintains claims to both territories. Their location on the North African coast gives them strategic importance in the relationship between Europe and Africa, particularly in matters involving borders, migration and regional security.

The original POLITICO report also referred to Morocco’s 1975 Green March, when tens of thousands of civilians mobilised to advance Morocco’s claim to Spanish Sahara. That episode remains a point of reference in Spanish discussions about whether pressure involving large civilian movements can affect territorial disputes.

The Green March concerned Spanish Sahara, not Ceuta or Melilla, and the historical events should not be treated as proof that the recent influx into Ceuta had the same purpose.

Nevertheless, the memory of the 1975 mobilisation helps explain why some Spaniards may view a sudden mass movement across a disputed border through a security lens. The survey indicates that concern about the enclaves is not limited to the immediate practical consequences of migration.

The current dispute therefore combines a longstanding sovereignty disagreement with more recent questions about border security and bilateral cooperation.

What does King Felipe VI’s visit mean for relations with Morocco?

King Felipe VI and Queen Letizia began their visit to Ceuta on 13 October, before travelling to Melilla on 14 October. The trip is the first royal visit to both enclaves since 2007 and comes after the July migration crisis intensified public and political attention.

The visit has symbolic significance because it publicly reinforces Spain’s institutional presence in territories over which Morocco maintains sovereignty claims. It also gives the royal household an opportunity to meet local representatives and acknowledge the pressures experienced by residents during the crisis.

According to reporting by Euronews, the royal programme includes meetings with local officials and civil society representatives, alongside visits to community institutions. The visit is taking place against a backdrop of continuing migration pressures and concerns about social cohesion in Ceuta.

The original POLITICO report said the king was expected to visit the Sidi Embarek cemetery, where around 90 people who died during the crisis were reportedly buried. Ceuta Deputy Mayor Kissy Chandiramani told POLITICO that Morocco had refused to repatriate the bodies, while analyst Ignacio Cembrero characterised that reported refusal as “a slap in the face”. These statements represent the views and claims attributed to the named individuals in the original report.

The king’s visit has also attracted attention because of its potential diplomatic implications. Spanish officials have publicly reaffirmed the country’s position on the enclaves, while Morocco has historically objected to high-profile Spanish royal visits to the territories.

However, a visit that affirms Spain’s position does not in itself indicate that either country intends to pursue military action.

How has Morocco responded to the latest tensions?

Morocco’s public response has included criticism of the existing migration cooperation arrangements with Spain.

In a public statement reported by Reuters on 9 October, King Mohammed VI said the current cooperation model had reached its limits following repeated migration crises. He also called for a new partnership approach centred on shared development, economic strength and regional stability.

The statement is important because it places the migration dispute within a broader discussion about the future of bilateral cooperation. It also indicates that the crisis has created pressure to reassess the arrangements through which the two countries manage irregular migration.

The supplied POLITICO report described the Moroccan king’s response to Felipe VI’s visit as notably restrained. In his first public appearance following the crisis, Mohammed VI acknowledged major challenges in cooperation with Spain but did not directly refer to the planned royal visit.

That measured public response should not be taken as proof that diplomatic tensions have been resolved. Equally, it does not establish that Morocco is preparing to escalate the dispute militarily.

The relationship involves competing positions on sovereignty alongside shared practical interests, particularly in managing migration and maintaining cross-border cooperation.

What do Spaniards expect for the future of Ceuta and Melilla?

Despite their concerns about a possible conflict, approximately two-thirds of respondents in the POLITICO survey expected Ceuta and Melilla to remain under Spanish control in 20 years.

This finding provides an important counterpoint to the figure of 58 per cent who considered an armed conflict likely within a decade. Respondents could regard tensions as dangerous while still expecting Spain to retain control of both territories over the longer term.

The two results measure different expectations: one concerns the perceived likelihood of armed confrontation, while the other concerns the anticipated future status of the enclaves.

Taken together, the findings suggest that many Spaniards distinguish between the possibility of a serious crisis and the likelihood of a lasting change in sovereignty.

The poll does not establish what will happen over the next decade or two. Its value lies in documenting public attitudes at a time when migration, territorial integrity and Spain’s relationship with Morocco are receiving heightened attention.

Background: How did the July migration crisis affect Spain–Morocco relations?

The immediate context for the survey was the mass crossing into Ceuta at the end of July 2026.

According to the UK House of Commons Library’s briefing published on 13 August, more than 70,000 migrants entered the Spanish enclave from Morocco without authorisation. The Spanish authorities subsequently reported that tens of thousands had returned to Morocco, with the government describing the returns as voluntary.

The scale of the movement triggered political criticism of the Spanish government and questions about the security of the EU’s external border. It also generated competing accounts of the causes of the crisis.

Sánchez blamed criminal networks and rejected claims that Morocco had directed the influx. Opposition figures questioned that explanation, while a police report cited in the original POLITICO coverage alleged Moroccan involvement.

The crisis also unfolded against the longstanding dispute over Ceuta and Melilla. Morocco claims sovereignty over the enclaves, while Spain continues to administer them as autonomous cities.

The September survey was conducted before Sánchez announced a snap election, according to the original POLITICO report. Its publication on 13 October provides a measure of Spanish public perceptions following the summer emergency, but it does not establish that the crisis will lead to a military confrontation.

Prediction: How could the findings affect Spanish residents, businesses and European security policy?

The most immediate potential effect is continued political attention to border security and Spain’s relationship with Morocco. The poll demonstrates that a substantial proportion of respondents are concerned about the possibility of conflict, which could increase pressure on political leaders to explain how they intend to protect territorial integrity and prevent another large-scale border emergency.

For residents of Ceuta and Melilla, the central practical issues are likely to remain border management, public services, community relations and confidence in the authorities’ ability to respond to future emergencies. The survey alone cannot determine whether these concerns will lead to changes in government policy.

For businesses operating across Spain and Morocco, sustained diplomatic uncertainty could make the relationship more difficult to assess. Companies involved in cross-border trade, transport and logistics may need to pay close attention to official announcements and any changes in border procedures. The available evidence does not establish that the poll itself will cause commercial disruption.

For European policymakers, the findings add to the debate over how to respond to sudden migration movements while distinguishing between humanitarian needs, criminal smuggling and allegations of politically motivated pressure. Any new emergency framework will depend on decisions by the relevant European institutions and national governments rather than public opinion figures alone.